This work attempts to understand why the work of Augustine of Hippo has experienced such a widespread revival in postmodernity, especially in the writings of Jacques Derrida. At first glance, an alliance between a postmodern atheist and a fourth century bishop and saint seems an unlikely one. However, it is not so strange if one considers that Augustine deals extensively with the problems of sin and guilt. The residue of his guilt survives even the grace of his conversion. The connection between Augustine and the postmoderns is, perhaps, found in the common experience of guilt. The postmoderns are plagued by guilt without the consolation of absolution: guilt for the excesses of modernity, guilt for the rape of the environment, guilt for the holocaust, guilt for surviving when so many others did not. This work contends that Augustine's thought and Derrida's thought are, both, enriched by this odd, but fruitful, play of interpretations. This chapter attempts to situate Augustine in a postmodern context. It will focus primarily on Augustine's text but read that text from a postmodern perspective.
Herein, Augustine proposes a theory of language and hermeneutics of meaning which is not often employed in Western thought. He speaks of the "ears of his heart" (ecce aures cordis mei). This heart without repose (cor irrequietum) is the foundation of Augustine's theology and spirituality. However, it is also at the center of his epistemology. As Gabriel Marcel commented in his attempt to understand disquiet in the thought of Augustine, "this heart is not separated from the thought which genuinely constitutes man as such." 5 Augustine would have no strange gods before God, not even a god of his own invention, not even an idol crafted in the subtle creativity of his own mind: You shall have no strange Gods before me, and remember, all gods are strange, especially the ones we dream up for ourselves.
There is a complex theory of language, a highly sophisticated hermeneutic of meaning which runs through the whole of the Confessions, indeed throughout the whole of Augustine's theology. However, it is within the context of the Confessions that this hermeneutical tension is most evident. It is as though Augustine vacillates between two extremes: I cannot speak; I must speak; I cannot speak; I must speak; and so on, in an infinite play of impossible speech. Speech is twisted and tortured so as to discover that which is beyond all discovery. Language presumes to present the unpresentable. Augustine specifies: "If anyone finds your simultaneity beyond his understanding, it is not for me to explain it. Let him be content to say 'What is this?' (Exod. 116: 15). So too let him rejoice and delight in finding you who are beyond all discovery rather than failing to find you by supposing you to be discoverable." 6 The word is not heard due to the fact that one supposes that one might actually, and exhaustively, hear it. Augustine sets forth an odd, yet immensely fruitful, puzzle of language. The very meaning to be gained in speech is lost in the presumption of speaking. Discovery is barred at the precise moment when discovery is presumed to be possible. The possible meaning is only possible as impossible. Further on, Augustine will ask: "Who understands his sins?" 7 He might just as well have asked, who understands his words? Or, who understands the speech by which one asks: who understands...?
The matter of central importance for Augustine clarifies itself with his implied criticism of Cicero, "whose language (but not his heart) almost everyone admires." 8 The "but not his heart" phrase should follow the Latin, pectus non ita, and be relieved of parentheses. There is no less parenthetical phrase in all of Augustine's writings. Augustine, despite being one of the most gifted writers in the history of the West, perceives that a fluid style is useless if one has nothing to say. Moreover, the something of speech is not a matter of mental gymnastics, cleverness or wit. The something to say flows from the heart. Cicero does not lack talent, native intelligence or a felicitous capacity for expression. Cicero lacks the contents of the heart. Cicero wrote/spoke beautifully, prettily convincingly and, most of all, vapidly.
The tender and exquisite conclusion to Book III presents an example of Monica speaking an impossible word. Monica goes to a bishop to ask him to debate with Augustine and turn him from the error of his ways. The bishop declines, claiming that Augustine is unready for repentance. Monica, with the persistence and shamelessness of a mother, will not take no for an answer: "She pressed him with more begging and floods of tears, asking him to see me and debate with me. He was irritated and a little vexed and said: 'Go away from me: as you live, it cannot be that the son of so many tears should perish."^ Monica presses the bishop with begging and floods of tears-hardly a rational argument but an argument nonetheless. The bishop is not moved by her logical arguments. Rather, the bishop is moved by her tears. Moreover, the bishop does not respond with a rational, or even psychological, argument. Instead, he offers an extraordinary confession of faith: "It cannot be that the son of so many tears should perish." These words are understood by Monica the way that one understands music-in an immediate mediation to her heart. 10 It is impossible to separate the content of what is being given in this heavenly presence from its manner of being given. Hence, "she had taken these words as if they had sounded from heaven."" Monica speaks and then receives a word in a new and subtle language, the language of the heart. She speaks, if such a thing is possible (or at least possible as impossible), a word of tears. Heaven replies, if such a thing is possibly impossible, with an inaudible word of comfort, not spoken (elicit) but sounded (sonuisset) from heaven. Monica hears a sounding and not a speaking.
This sounding as opposed to speaking is of crucial importance. With the sounding, Monica grasps an ineffable meaning, a meaning which cannot quite be distilled into words. It is a meaning which can be talked about and around but never directly addressed, never distilled. As Socrates said of the fear of death, "You must sing incantations over it every day until you charm the bogy away." 12 Again, it is the analogy of music which may shed some light upon this impossible speaking. In a certain sense, the entirety of the Confessions is a sung incantation. Augustine sings over his sins and, once charmed, his song gives rise to thought.
Augustine is a son of many tears. Even in sin, he wandered, "being seduced and seducing, being deceived and deceiving, in a variety of desires."'
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The wetness of his tears and his mother's tears, certainly drench his confessional biography. Those The philosopher is obligated to determine the difference between the contents of that which is presented and the manner of being present, while all the while realizing that these two can never be completely separated. The manner of being present carries one into the region of the heart. Weeping, in a manner of speaking, recreates the world and broadens the possibility of what the world might mean for the weeper: "Man is a vast deep, whose hairs, Lord, you have numbered, and in you none can be lost. Yet, it is easier to count his hairs than the passions and emotions of his heart." 16 The topography of the human heart is complex. The movements of the heart open a vast field of questions, aporias and hermeneutical tensions. Nevertheless, no mystery is more mysterious than the soul awakening. The soul is a vast deep and is only explicable as inexplicable.
For Augustine, clarity and precision are low-order virtues; they are important but only in reference to relatively unimportant matters. Certainly, clarity and precision shed little light on the soul. For example, Aristotle's book on the categories impressed Augustine as being "an extremely clear statement about substances." 17 This clarity gave birth to a deeper and darker confusion: "What help was it to me when this book was also an obstacle? Thinking that absolutely everything that exists is comprehended under the ten categories, I tried to conceive you also, my God, wonderfully simple and immutable, as if you too were a subject of which beauty and magnitude are attributes." 18 The clarity of the Categories obviates its original purpose. In the end, the book is not a light to illumine the way but an obstacle in the path. To employ a distinctively Augustinian analogy, this ultra-clear rationality turns upon itself like a dog upon its master ("et latrare adversum /e"), 19 literally that is, I "barked" against Thee.
The start of Book V hints at an interesting possibility. Augustine writes: "Your entire creation never ceases to praise you and is never silent. Every spirit continually praises you with mouth turned towards you; animals and physical matter find a voice through those who contemplate you. So from weariness our soul rises towards you, first supporting itself on the created order and then passing on to you yourself who wonderfully made it." 20 There are two crucial matters at stake in this brief quote. As usual, Augustine, a profound interpreter of texts, needs careful interpretation.
First, he claims that, "animals and physical matter find a voice." How could animals, much less physical matter, find a voice? What speaking is spoken by animals, brutish by definition? Moreover, how might it be possible that inanimate and opaque matter finds a voice? Doubtless, such a dual miracle is mediated through "those who contemplate them." Nevertheless, we who speak are able to give voice to the mute and make sense of the prosaic meaninglessness of the pure given. The human being speaks, and impossibly speaks, for the less than human. Hence, the human is revealed as more than human. Augustine dreams the dream of the unspeakable, the ineffable, the impossible. He does so by the tortured logic of confession. He speaks for the less human by the same illogical logic whereby he speaks of his sin, his guilt and his tears.
Second, "the weariness of our soul rises toward you." The inability to speak is a manner of speaking. Obviously, one must take care not to attribute too through-going a Platonism to Augustine. Still more absurd would be to claim that Augustine is, tout simple, a neo-Platonist after the fashion of Plotinus, insofar as, the created order passes over to the Creator. The physical order cannot explain itself by immanent causality. Instead, the metaphysical order makes sense of the physical order. This is, doubtless, true for Augustine. However, it would seem that postmodemity undertakes a similar tack in its critique of modernity.
It is not style, this or that manner of speaking, which determines truth: "Wisdom and foolishness are like food that is nourishing or useless. Whether the words are ornate or not does not decide the issue." 21 Faustus, who so greatly disappoints Augustine's high hopes, is not utterly disappointing. At the least, he is not one of "those many loquacious people," whom Augustine had to endure, who attempted to teach him while having nothing to say. Yet, the difference between Faustus and these unnamed prattlers has nothing to do with erudition, wit or method. Instead, Faustus is better, if only slightly better, because: "He had a heart which, if not right towards you, was at least very cautious with himself." 22 Truth is fashioned in the heart.
Here, the alliance with postmodernity is evident: "Picking up a phrase from Saint Augustine, Derrida says that truth in deconstruction has to do with doing or making truth (facere veritatem), making truth happen, effecting it, forming and forging truth." 23 Reality is not deconstructed in deconstruction. Rather, the fable world of constructed method is deconstructed so as to allow the undeconstructible to impossibly present itself. However, this undeconstructible is not utterly obscure, even if it is not precisely on the order of scientific or rational knowledge. The trace of meaning in Augustine's tears is "heterogeneous to the formalizable order of knowledge."
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It is always shocking to realize that Augustine lived in the fourth and fifth, and not the seventeenth, century. There are passages which one could well imagine to have come from Descartes: "I wanted to be as certain about things I could not see as I am certain that seven and three are ten." 25 In a sense, Augustine is already postmodern before the outbreak of modernity. He confronts the problem of certainty in knowledge and moves toward faith rather than criticism. Hence, if not actually postmodern, he is at least post critical. He does not go around, but through, the critical question.
Once confronted with the problem of certitude, Augustine undergoes a gradual conversion, which is as much epistemological as it spiritual: Then, little by little, Lord, with a gentle and merciful hand you touched and calmed my heart. I considered the innumerable things I believed which I had not seen, events which occurred when I was not present, such as many incidents in the history of nations, many facts concerning places and cities which I have never seen, many things accepted on the word of friends, many from physicians, many from other people. Unless we believed what we were told, we would do nothing at all in this life. Finally, I realized how unmoveably sure I was about the identity of my parents from whom I came, which I could not know unless I believed what I heard.
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It dawns on Augustine that even the simplest and most self-evident data of ordinary knowledge would be rendered inaccessible if forced to live up to the rigid and impossible criteria of certainty. The difference between Augustine and his modern counterparts is that he deems it counter-intuitive and absurd to conclude that "I cannot know if the sun will rise tomorrow." Belief, therefore, is not set against knowledge. To the contrary, belief is the precise condition of the possibility of knowledge. The fault lays not with belief but with unbelief, in that, unbelief cannot even sustain itself in a meaningful way. The unbeliever, should he be radical and constant in his unbelief is, at best, reduced to silence. At worst, the unbeliever subverts his own truths in a circular movement of epistemic suicide.
The quest for certitude is ultimately self-defeating on many levels, the most evident of which is the psychological level. Certitude is a brand of intellectual neurosis. The lust for certitude must be set aside so that the mind can engage in the free play which is constitutive of thought itself. Extreme anxiety, even anxiety as to the justifications of thinking, petrifies thought. Truth is something like a relaxation, a fluidity of human faculties in a perpetual play: "When are we to recreate ourselves and unbend our minds, allowing the mind to relax from the tensions of anxieties?"
The progress of uneasiness and anxiety resolving themselves in faith is manifest in Augustine. Gabriel Marcel makes the claim, "joy whatever one might think of it, does not exclude uneasiness such as we have seen it in particular define itself for St. Augustine."
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Uneasiness is the aspiration of the minus being (moinsetre) for the plus being (plus-etre). Augustine's thirst is ultimately quenched. However, one must take care not to travel too quickly through these middle Books of the Confessions, since one cannot appreciate the quenching unless one feels the thirst. Indeed, philosophical interpretations of The Confessions tend to jump immediately to books ten and eleven, on memory and time respectively. While one could argue that from a philosophical perspective these are crucial books, one might also argue that they are incomprehensible without the nine books of searching which precede them. It is necessary to interject a note of caution into these reflections, lest one attempt a wildly anachronistic work, something like Augustine as a postmodern Writer. Augustine is not a postmodern writer. However, the apophatic elements of his theology are consequential for postmodern thought: "Thus while it would be comical to find a negative theology in deconstruction, it would not be surprising to find deconstruction in negative theology-as a practice, as a strategy, as a way negative theologians have found to hold the claims of cataphatic theology at bay." 38 Truth, so contends Augustine, is more a matter of stability in than certainty about. This contention holds true throughout the Confessions. Moreover, the notion of truth as an assurance pervades the whole of Augustine's theology. Truth is not something grasped, something comprehended. Instead, truth grasps and comprehends us. As Augustine wrote in the Contra Faustus, "to know the truth we must live in the truth." Why? Simply put, because the truth is bigger than we are. We dwell in truth. The truth does not dwell in us.
There is a Zen story of four pygmies who went off into the dark jungle to seek the elephant God. In the darkest night, they find the elephant but it is so pitch black that they cannot see. They each touch the god in the darkness. Upon returning to their village, they are asked what the god was like. The first says, "he is like a wall." He touched the side of the elephant. The second says, "he is like a hose." He touched the nose of the elephant, The third said, "he is like a rope." He touched the tail. The fourth said, "he is like a tree." He grabbed he leg. The story ends with the question: which of the pygmies was right? Of course, they are all right insofar as they are able to grasp this thing that is so much bigger than themselves. This story, aside from its theological and ecumenical value, has epistemological implications. Truth is not something we produce. Instead, in a certain manner of speaking, we are productions of truth. Truth haloes us and prods us to attain a deeper ontological depth. By living in the truth, one's horizon is expanded and made more fecund. We grow in the truth; the truth does not grow in us. Like pygmies blindly grappling with the elephant god, we never exhaust, or even fully grasp, the object of our knowing. Therefore, the art of knowing is a perpetual and fully human struggle to dwell in truth. The rational or logical mode is only one way, among many ways, of knowing. Further, rationality grievously errs if it seeks to establish itself as the only mode of knowing. Rational discourse finds its impetus in a non-rational foundation and ultimately falls back exhausted on that foundation: "The arguments were exhausted and had all been refuted. The only thing left was a mute trembling, and, as if it were facing death it was terrified of being restrained from the treadmill of habit by which it suffered 'sickness unto death.'" 39 This mute trembling does not end in death. Instead, it gives way to the actual moment of conversion for Augustine. Trembling gives way to barely tempered truth. With Alypius in the garden at Milan, Augustine finally gives in to the ineluctable pull of conversion. Augustine goes off by himself and within him is, "precipitated a vast storm bearing a massive downpour of tears...I threw myself down somehow on a certain figtree, and let my tears flow freely. Rivers streamed from my eyes." 40 The all-important hinge moment of conversion is accomplished not with an argument or a syllogism, but by a dissolution into tears. Moreover, reminiscent of Monica's hearing a wordless message sounded from heaven, Augustine suddenly hears "a voice from a nearby house, chanting as if it might be a boy or a girl (I don't know which)." 41 The fact that the conversion is accomplished is testified to by Augustine. Yet, the conversion is accomplished with groans, sighs and tears. Augustine has remade the world through weeping. The warm, wet intimacy of his tears has accomplished what Cicero, Aristotle, Neo-Platonism and Manicheaism could not. Augustine has finally found the key to his heart, the secret and occult meaning of his desires. In a sense, the first paragraph of the Confessions is revealed in its true and fullest sense: "You stir man to take pleasure in praising you, because you have made us for yourself, and our heart is restless until it rests in you."
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Truth is not, can never be, a cold and detached truth. Augustine, could be read as an anticipatory corrective to Modernity. We are not detached spectators and reason cannot purify itself to such a degree that it accepts nothing as true except that which appears as clear and distinct to the mind. Perspective is not rarified and detached. Rather, perspective, as always, is already full.
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Book Ten is, in many ways, the highwater mark of the Confessions. The truth is explicitly bound together with Augustine's remembering and sighs and tears: "As to the other pleasures of life, regret at their loss should be in inverse proportion to the extent to which one weeps for them. The less we weep for them, the more we ought to be weeping." 44 Augustine being so deeply literary and yet cautious as to the adequacy of the written word, stands as the first great remedy to the problem of Western logocentricism.
Augustine writes, and tears drown his writing in a seemingly endless play of impossible speech: "This I desire to do, in my heart before you in confession, and before many witnesses with my pen."
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Here is a fascinating play of language and thought. The aim of Augustine's writing is to lay bear his heart in confessions. However, he will do this "with his pen before many witnesses." Hence, "What could be hidden within me, even if I were unwilling to confess it to you? I would be hiding you from myself, not myself from you. Now, however, my groaning is witness that I am displeased with myself." There is no limit to the power of memory in Augustine. It is vast and infinitely profound. The hegemony of logos is here re-ordered and disciplined in Augustine's epistemology.
Actually, the source of logos' discoursivity is to be found in the brooding, silent, wordless presence of memory. The mind's encounter with the treasure store of memory is not creative on the part of the mind. The mind does not produce what it thinks. Instead: "By thinking we, as it were, gather together ideas which the memory contains in a dispersed and disordered way, and by concentrating our attention we arrange them in order as if ready to hand, stored in the very memory where previously they lay hidden, scattered, and neglected." 53 Hence, the mind is not productive, much less purely creative. The mind serves a purely regulative and ancillary function, and thought is in the service of memory.
The contents of thought need to be gathered (cogenda) so as to be known. They are collected from a dispersed state: "It is what is collected (that is, by force) in the mind, not elsewhere, which is strictly speaking the object of recollection." 54 The mind gathers by force, by a violence. Further, this violent gathering passes over much of what it would gather up: "Metaphysical illusion consists in treating a presentation like a situation...A presentation does not present a universe to someone; it is the event of its (inapprehensible) presence." 55 Augustine is no less aware of the danger of metaphysical illusion than is Kant. In fact, Augustine's fear of infidelity would render him even more loathe to transgress Divine mystery than Kant is loathe to allow the faculties to transgress one another's domain. For Kant, metaphysical illusion is only a mistake. For Augustine, metaphysical illusion would be idolatry.
The alliance of thought with idolatry is a subtle and ever-shifting one. Thought tends toward idolatry as a final and mortal temptation. There is a natural tendency to close off the aporia and so to strangle thought. Augustine the thinker resists this temptation with the shield of confession: "I at least, Lord, have difficulty at this point, and I find my own self hard to grasp. I have become for myself a soil which is a cause of difficulty and much sweat." 56 The exploration of the soul is a cause of much sweat and toil. Moreover, the image of the soil is not chosen capriciously. The soil is never all tilled. The soil is perpetually tilled anew. One can see a connection to the aforementioned slogan of Derrida: "To think is tore-think." One is never quite done with thinking. In fact, if one claims to be done, we can be sure of one thing at least, that one is no longer thinking.
The passage on forgetfulness is also relevant: "But what is nearer to me than myself? Indeed the power of my memory is something I do not understand when without it I cannot speak about myself. What shall I say when it is certain to me that I remember forgetfulness?" 57 Augustine takes great delight in playing with many paradoxes which constitute thinking and speaking, if not thought and language. We remember forgetfulness. With memory, as later with time, Augustine knows what memory and time are until he is asked to explain. Then, he is unable to tell us. He knows and he does not know. Or, he knows until he reflects on it and then he no longer knows-an impossible speaking being spoken nonetheless:
What is time? Who can explain this easily and briefly? Who can comprehend this even in thought so as to articulate the answer in words? Yet what do we speak of, in our familiar everyday conversation, more than of time? We surely know what we mean when we speak of it. We also know what is meant when we hear someone else talking about it. What then is time? Provided that no one asks me, I know. If I want to explain it to an inquirer, I do not know. 58 Augustine shows time and memory to be mysteries in the deepest sense of the word. He tells us that we cannot know them; then, he proceeds to spend the two longest and most difficult chapters of The Confessions writing about them, writing precisely about things of which he does not know. However, it is a speaking that remains always a speaking and never attains the level of speech. As Marcel would say, the mode of speaking in not so much a thought that is all thought out (pensee pensee) as it is a thinking thought {pensee pensante). This distinction corresponds roughly to what Bergson has termed an opened {pensee pensante), as opposed to a closed ( The answer to this question constitutes a perpetual deferral in the thought of Augustine. When will he exhaust the mystery of God? Clearly, never! Nevertheless, "the drops of time are precious to him." The question, the search for an answer which is perpetually unattainable, this questioning is itself precious and sacred. It is as though Augustine defers with a nearly Derridadean gesture. When? Not yet. When? Not yet. When? He told us at the beginning. Our hearts were made for Yourself, O Lord, and they are restless-they will ever be restless-until they rest in You. Until that moment, the answer will always and ever be: "Not Yet!"
The postmoderns are fascinated with Augustine. Subsequent chapters will attempt to sort out why this is true for several particular thinkers. As a provisional answer, it seems that they are deeply interested in the Augustinian self, the confessing soul. The uncanny and mystical aspect of Augustine's thought is expressed in a deluge of tears, sighs and physical groans. 
